

4. HESYCHIA, SALVATION, INEFFABILITY, AND QUIETUDE: ST GREGORY PALAMAS AND L. WITTGENSTEIN ON THE ESCAPIST AND FUTILE MISCONCEPTIONS OF ONTOLOGICAL SALVATION AND METAPHYSICAL HINGES

DR. CONSTANTINOS ATHANASOPOULOS

Abstract: I start with the discussion of some key elements of ancient Greek ethics (tracing a line from Homer to Aristotle via Plato: non-rationalist; metaphysics connected to and one with ethics; various human discourses and endeavours having to do with praxis are unified). I try to see how for ancient Greek philosophers (and even philosophers of other traditions and epochs, such as contemporary philosophers and Christian philosophers, such as St Gregory Palamas), the issues of Greek ethics and metaphysics leave a person with unsolved problems and a longing for (philosophical) salvation. Then, I move on to Wittgenstein's views on ethics. I use here language games, the unsayable, hinges, and forms of life as key parts of the Wittgensteinian puzzle. I finish with Palamas' views on hesychasm; I find that Palamas not only continues the ancient Greek tradition of ethics (in at least some of its agenda having to do with salvation) but also comes close to Wittgenstein's views on ethics.

Keywords: Greek ethics, akrasia, hesychasm, Palamas, Wittgenstein, salvation, asceticism, mysticism, ineffability.

A. The Problem: Whence lies salvation? Some answers from the ancient Greeks

There are many ways to approach the problem of how best to interpret the aims and role of ancient Greek ethics and its key characteristics.

Some see it as an attempt by the ancient Greeks to make sense of their life in their context of social and political conflicts, extreme violence and their struggle for survival (see for example Johansen 1998, p.2, who claims that for the Greeks “the world was considered a rational orderly whole and in many ways the cosmic order was considered to be moral as well”; see also Vernant 1987; Irwin 2007). These theorists emphasise rationality as the key to understanding ancient Greek ethics. In this perspective, the ancient Greeks strove to be good because this is what made sense to them. It was the most rational thing to do in their social and political context and their ethics was a rational attempt to create a guide and code of conduct for social affairs. One could observe here that there are many overgeneralisations and factual inaccuracies regarding the specifics of ancient Greek ethics presented in the view of the above-mentioned scholars and their followers; for example, there is no satisfactory explanation of the irrational moral behaviour among the ancient Greek gods and associated mythology- note that some of the behaviour of these gods (even though irrational) provided parts of the moral code of the ancient Greeks (see the example of Xenios Zeus). In addition, one cannot but notice an anachronistic Kantian twist in such an approach (see the relevant discussion of Aristotle’s ideas on friendship as contrary to most modern moral philosophy, including Kant, in Nehamas 2010).

However, I wish to claim the main reason for rejecting such an approach is not just the distance in time (and the different social-political context), which makes such a Kantian approach to Greek Ethics so implausible; it is also the culturally specific Hellenic context and the specific cultural vision of the ancient Greeks (Nehamas 2010). Their cosmology, religious myths, and customs had nothing to do with puritan Kantian theism, where God becomes a logical necessity (see Kant 1793; Hare 2011; Firestone and Palmquist 2006)—impersonal, universal and vague, a more or less rational idea about transcendence. For the ancient Greeks, gods were in their ontology and behaviour (if you take away their significant powers and immortality) like humans; they were concrete and had unique characteristics, placed within their circumstances of existence. Their main difference from mortals was focused on their immortality and their enhanced power. The ancient Greeks lived life to the full and avoided the cold, impartial, and calculated measurements of universal law. To be good, for them, required different kinds of behaviour, which depended on who the person doing the good was, what his role in society was, and what part he played in the cosmos. Gods, for them, were more powerful than humans, but, in essence, they were humanlike competitors in their struggle to experience life to the full; in some occasions, they were even

antagonists, interfering with humans to keep them back and punish them for desiring to be something they were not (Σακελλαρίου 1796; Anton 1860). This cosmology, which was in essence both a philosophical and a religious outlook on life and the universe, is what made the Homeric epics so attractive to the ancient Greeks (in my approach here I am strongly in favour of Vlastos' attempt to bring religion into the early history of the philosophy of the Greeks; see Vlastos 1952; see also Jaeger 1948). This cosmology (and its associated anthropology) is that which is depicted and sung in the Homeric epics, describing the war between the Greeks and the Trojans around 1300 B.C., and what happened to Odysseus after the fall of Troy. Drama, as a superb and unique art form, was developed by the Greeks around the fifth and sixth centuries B.C. (not long after the oral tradition of the Homeric epics was produced in written form for the first time) to celebrate Dionysus, the god of wine, mysticism, and festivities. This artform allowed the Greeks to think more about the significance of the Homeric epics, the Homeric gods, and their mythology; the tragedies produced made them think about their human greatness in weakness and vulnerability. Tragedy, in this way, as the fulfilment of the agenda found in the Homeric epics, became the Greek *coup d'état* against the cosmos (for the relation of tragedy to philosophy see the work of Critchley 2019). It is a grave mistake to disengage ancient Greek ethics (and, in general, all other areas of philosophy) from its roots in Homeric works. The Presocratics, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Sceptics, the Cynics, Epicurus, Epictetus, and the Stoics developed and created their own syntheses based on Homeric moral understanding, values, and ways of seeing the world and acting in it. This is because parts of the Homeric epics were standard textbook material for all Greek children whose parents had the means to pay tutors and thus, be provided with the necessary education (Σακελλαρίου 1796; Jaeger 1986).

Let us start then with Homer. What are the key ethical ideas we find in the Homeric epics (the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*)? In these texts, we find that it is the heroic deed that makes you immortal, against the will of the immortals. Achilles epitomizes this endeavour. In the *Iliad*, we see in Achilles the model of the Homeric hero; one who defies the gods, strives for excellence and pays the price for glory in death. But this death is not shameful. It is the death of Achilles: dying on the battlefield, while striving to excel (note that this was the guiding principle he received from his father: αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων 'always strive to excel and be better than all the rest' in *Ιλιάδα* Λ, 784; also see *Ιλιάδα*, Ζ, 208, where Ippolachos gives the same advice to his son Glaukos, a fact which indicates that this view on excellence was shared widely among the

Greeks). It is, however, still a death, and one that the ancient Greeks (trying always to live their lives to the fullest) found quite tragic—even an Achilles full of glory, longs for life and salvation from death. Note that in the *Odyssey*, when Odysseus, upon meeting Achilles in Hades, compliments Achilles as the happiest and most blessed of all mortals, Achilles replies that he is “a shadow of Achilles” and that he would prefer to be alive and an insignificant and humble servant rather than be “Achilles and dead” (*Οδύσσεια* λ, 465-491).

Is there any rationality (at least in terms of our moral standards of rationality) in all of this? Of course not. In another work, I argued against any rationalistic attempts to appropriate the richness of Homeric ethics and make it more suited to (and digestible for) our contemporary moral standards. Having as a focus the relevant work of Nicholas D. Smith, I argued that any attempt to use a rationalist Aristotelian concept of *eudaimonia* to understand some of the morality of the Homeric epics is a rather poor and unimaginative attempt to approach Homeric ethical ideals, with their focus on heroic ethics (Athanasopoulos 2011; but note that I distance myself from Dodds 1962: I do not claim that Homeric ethics is irrational, just non-rational). In my approach, I also oppose the interpretation of some researchers, such as Apressyan, who think that Homeric society is “a society of *arising* morality” (Apressyan 2014, p.68). In the Homeric epics, we see a fully worked out ethical system; the audience of the Homeric epics was moved to noble and moral action and examples of the behaviour of Homeric heroes were analysed and used by Plato and Aristotle to teach about ethics. That we (today) do not recognise Homeric ethics as offering a fully worked out system of morals is due to our Kantian and Hegelian heritage. For a Kantian moral philosopher, Homeric society cannot have morality, because there is no evidence of a consistent system of reference to a universal law of moral conduct. In my perspective, morality cannot be distinguished from one’s life (it is not the same concept, but it is inextricably connected to it). How one chooses to live creates his morality. In Homer we see that people have a specific mindset about life: they have a theory about what is life and what is death, how humans and gods behave, and how they should behave. We have, in this way, a specific Homeric metaphysics (about the cosmos, human life, and the gods) that guides them in their moral conduct and their ethical intuitions. In this way, the Homeric epics describe not only the metaphysics but also the morality of Homeric society. That we find it difficult to understand and categorise this morality appropriately with our conceptual myopia is our fault, not Homer’s nor the fault of the society that he described. Whether one chooses to follow a universal law of

morality is irrelevant here. I stress that my approach is far from any such (Kantian) attempt to understand Homeric society and its ethics.

Let us move now to Plato, which is the second stop in our investigation. Undoubtedly, we could make further stops in the history of Greek ethics, addressing those such as the Presocratics, but for ease of reference and in the context of the limited space of this work, I will only refer to Plato and Aristotle (who is going to provide us with material for our third stop in our investigation). In Plato, we find again metaphysics guiding ethics. We have the theory of the tripartite soul that inhabits a body as its prison and the theory of Forms: all ethical ideals and models of life should have these Forms of the 'good' and the 'just' firmly fixed as their point of reference. The soul's survival and a positive fate depend on this (see Shields 2010; Bussanich 2013). In the *Republic*, the philosophers who know these Forms are the ones that should be responsible (as educators of their society) to guide and steer by necessity (*ανάγκη*) all people into incorporating these into their ethical frames of reference (because only the philosophers are the only ones that can be truly virtuous—see *Republic*, 500B-540C; Irwin 1995; Bobonitch 2002). The philosopher king is thus elevated to the point of *Demiurge* in social affairs: being aware of his lack of self-sufficiency (because, after all, he is only a mortal), he creates a natural and cultural-social environment where laws and customs are to produce a new human, saved from all corruption, both in his soul and in his body, motivated to always do what is good and just. Note, however, that this picture leaves many questions without an adequate answer. One problem is to do with motivation: how is one to motivate the majority of the people to follow the philosophers in this social engineering? This is a serious problem because in Book 7 of the *Republic* it becomes clear that the aims of the virtuous and knowledgeable philosophers are not the same as the aims of the majority (who are more interested in luxury and comfort than the knowledge of the Forms; see Duncan and Steiberger 1990). Even though we may see the philosopher-king as a milestone in the creation of this new (improved) version of humanity, little is said about what this new human will look like and what his main characteristics will be (see Dobbs 2003, pp.1081-2). There have been attempts to find a solution to the problem of moral motivation; many commentators in ancient and Byzantine times noted that Aristotle's ethical and political theory was a solution to Plato's problem of moral motivation. In more recent times, researchers have looked to other works for a solution (see Vasiliou 2015) but with poor results; one could ask here: is it not itself a problem that Plato leaves this issue unresolved here?

Another (but related) problem is that of *akrasia* (ἀκρασία). *Akrasia* (which has been translated as ‘weakness of the will’—a term and a concept that is not the same) is a major problem for Plato’s ethical theory. This is because Socrates believes that no one knowingly or willingly does wrong; to know that something is bad and nevertheless to go ahead and do it makes this action incomprehensible. But the reality is different. Many people do what is wrong, even if they know that it is bad. And, what is worse, they desire to do it again (and will do it again and again, given the chance). Look at how difficult (even impossible) it is for people to give up smoking or stop using addictive substances. They know that it is bad for them to engage in these activities and nevertheless they keep on doing them. Surely, they should be able to stop their addictive habits through reading, understanding, and absorbing the *Republic* (and perhaps other philosophical treatises on human development or even some key self-help books) but they are not. Here, we find researchers who claim that for Socrates’ perspective there is no problem to solve here because, if one’s passions allow him to see clearly the truth in a given situation, then he will do the action that corresponds to this truth without been influenced by his passions in his resolve (see Brickhouse and Smith 2007). But this is too weak: we have *akrasia* when we see that the contemplated action is wrong; so, in this sense, we know the truth. And we nevertheless do this action that we see as wrong. One can argue that for the philosopher-king in the *Republic*, *akrasia* is impossible (see Shields 2007); his soul is so unified, simple, and so seamless in thought and action, that *akrasia* is an impossibility for him. But, taking into consideration that for Plato there was no such philosopher-king in existence in his time, it begs the question as to how realistic such an idea really is. So, it seems that in Plato we find serious problems not only in his social philosophy but also with his anthropology, especially in relation to moral psychology, which makes it impossible for humans to find a solution to their problems in life (esp. in the quite frequent cases of *akrasia*). Moral people need to find a meaning that will solve their social and moral problems (esp. those like the one of *akrasia*). We can see here that the ancient Greeks would have found Plato to have both failed them and reminded them of the tragic reality of their lives (which they had learned to recognise via Homer and ancient Greek drama); their vulnerability encompasses them from all sides (both personal and social) and they see that there is no salvation, even if they accept the belief in almighty reason offered by Plato’s *Republic* (I will define “salvation” in detail in the following section).

Let us proceed now to Aristotle. For most commentators on ancient Greek philosophy, one can find in Aristotle a more unified system

of thought, one that makes finding answers easier and avoids discrepancies and contradictions. But, even for believers in this consistent unification of metaphysics and ethics (which is easier to achieve in the Aristotelian corpus because they have the form of lecture notes as a purposeful attempt to avoid unanswered questions), there remain problems that are left unresolved. One of the key ideas in Aristotle's ethics is the idea that humans pursue the good so that they can achieve *eudaimonia* (εὐδαιμονία, a term that has been translated as "happiness", which I consider rather poor because it does not refer to the "daimon" part of the Greek word; a better translation might be: "what is pleasing to the gods"; see further in Athanasopoulos 2018). This provides answers to the problem of sufficiently motivating the majority to follow a minority of knowledgeable rulers and the problem of *akrasia* (Plato tried to solve this problem in later work, such as the *Republic*, but the problem of insufficient motivation remained, even though it mutated; see Brickhouse and Smith 2010, pp.193-247). The solution that was provided with *eudaimonia*, however, created more problems for Aristotle, as we will see.

In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle provides both a formal definition of *eudaimonia* (i.e., the general principles that one can have in mind when considering the application of the term) and a material definition of it (i.e., Aristotle examines what kind of life satisfies the principles of the application of the term). Let us examine in more detail the views of Aristotle (which were the focus of St Gregory Palamas' studies as a young man while at the University of Constantinople, being taught by Theodoros Metochites, 1270-1332, a famous Aristotelian of the time and a personal adviser to Byzantine emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos, 1259-1332). Aristotle points out, in the first book of *Nicomachean Ethics* (one of the key works in Aristotelian ethics) that *eudaimonia* is a good that we desire for its own sake (1095a15-22).

From Aristotle's discussion of *eudaimonia* in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, we can establish that it has three key characteristics:

1. Aristotle thinks *eudaimonia* is not a psychological state, nor a state of the mind, but rather an activity—the activity of living with virtue. A good life is one that realises the full potential of human life (1098b30-1).

2. *Eudaimonia* is not something subjective that depends on the way people individually perceive it. For Aristotle, it is an objective value, independent of people's perception of it. It relates to an objective judgement about one's life, as a good human life. That is not to say anything (directly) about their state of mind; nor is it a judgement that the person making it has any special authority over. By contrast, if someone

says they are happy or unhappy, it is difficult to correct them or to even know better than the person concerned.

3. *Eudaimonia* is not something easily changed. It does not come and go as happiness (usually) does. This is so because it is an evaluation of a life lived well or a person (a good person) as a whole (i.e., considering the life of a person in its totality). Usually, for Aristotle it is evaluated as such, after a stable way of life has been established. This is in agreement with most ancient Greeks' beliefs that *eudaimonia* was to be determined after death (things that take place after death are as important as things that take place during life). See, for example, Homer's discussion of Achilles when visited by Odysseus in Book 11 of the *Odyssey*; see also the portrayal of the main characters of Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex* and *Antigone*.

Aristotle insists that *eudaimonia* is not:

a) Pleasure; it cannot be a pleasure because some people go looking for animal pleasures and we are looking for something that is related only to humans;

b) Money and honour; it cannot be money and honour because they can both be used to further some end;

c) Virtue; it cannot be a virtue because virtue is compatible with inactivity, great misfortune, and pain. *Eudaimonia* is the activity of the rational soul, which acts in accordance with virtue; but it is not the virtues themselves because someone can claim to have virtue without having *eudaimonia* (1099a31-b6; 1153b17-19; cf. 1098a16-1102a5).

For Aristotle, *eudaimonia* is the only good that can be pursued for its own sake and not as a means to another end. In this way, he believes that *eudaimonia* is a final end without qualification. It is also self-sufficient: it cannot be made more desirable by adding something else to it. If we are to add to it some other good, such as knowledge, for example, it is just to make that other thing part of *eudaimonia*. *Eudaimonia* is the only self-sufficient good. This actually means that achieving it completely satisfies a human being and with it they will desire nothing else.

Of particular importance for our discussion of *eudaimonia* are books 6 and 10 in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In Book 10, Aristotle claims that *eudaimonia* needs to have pleasure but not just any pleasure: only the pleasure of doing good is of value for *eudaimonia*. What is truly pleasant is what is pleasant to the good person, and this is a life of virtuous activity, not a life of mere amusement. In Book 6, he considers what kind of reason is relevant to *eudaimonia*: he finds that both practical and theoretical reason are important and necessary for *eudaimonia*. And, while some animals can have practical reason, it is only humans that have theoretical reason. This ability is our share of 'divinity'. *Eudaimonia*, therefore, must

include the excellent activity of theoretical reason, which is philosophy. Theoretical reason is far more important than practical reason (both are needed, but the theoretical form is more important), because:

1. It is the best activity we can have: with it, we contemplate what is best (what is greatest and most divine in the universe), not merely what is best for us (as in practical wisdom).

2. We can engage more continuously in it than anything else, leading to continuous *eudaimonia*.

3. It leads to pure and lasting pleasures. It leads to more leisure for worthy and *eudaimonia* related actions.

4. It is the most self-sufficient activity related to *eudaimonia*.

6. It is related more to what makes us characteristically human and different from animals. Given our nature, it is the most pleasurable thing that we can engage in. We get pleasure through it that we cannot get through anything else.

In the later books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, we also see Aristotle claiming that having good friends who are virtuous and engaged in projects related to living a good life, as well as being part of a well-organised *polis* and living harmoniously with others in a society, are also important for *eudaimonia* (even though they are not as important as engaging in activities related to theoretical reason, such as philosophy and mathematics, etc.).

However, in this elaborate Aristotelian system of ethics, we still find problems: a) we do not and can not know the intentions of others, and b) we can not control the character or the moral virtue of others. In this way, we are still morally vulnerable (for example, in the case of a friend who was good, but who has now turned to evil—we are vulnerable and lose our *eudaimonia*). This goes against the criteria of “finality” and “self-sufficiency” that are considered so important for *eudaimonia* (see Cooper 2004, esp. pp.270-308). This problem of moral vulnerability brings out further problems in the Aristotelian theory of virtue and how it is related to his theory of *eudaimonia* (see a relevant discussion of the problem in Nussbaum 2001 (1986), pp.343-372; Pritzl 1983; and DuBois 2014).

Aristotle recognises this vulnerability in the ethics he presents in his *Poetics*, when he discusses tragedy (*Ποιητική* 1449b). Note here that the *Poetics* was relatively unknown in the Mediaeval West, but it was widely known and commented upon in the Eastern Byzantine Empire and possibly studied by Palamas while he was a student at the University of Constantinople. In the definition of tragedy, Aristotle emphasises the use of pity (*ἔλεον* often poorly translated as “pity” here) and fear (*φόβον*) by the poet to produce *catharsis* (*κάθαρση*). These sentiments or passions are

created because, in a tragedy (as a dramatic form of art), the events depicted represent what humans actually feel when confronted with the perils, mysteries, and wonders of life. In other words, we see in Aristotle an understanding that his *eudaimonia* as motivation and impetus for the leading of a moral life is extremely limited and problematic: one needs more to be truly happy. To resolve this Aristotle proposes *catharsis*, which comes through tragedy as an art form mimicking, in superb fashion, the tragedy of life: via *catharsis* we unburden ourselves from the emotional pressure that we feel when we realise that our rational moral system in dealing with the perils, mysteries and wonders of life is flawed (see for a sympathetic to this approach the work of Zeller-Nestle 1988, pp. 259-260, 325-326). Having this valuable knowledge of the Aristotelian discussion of the unavoidable character of tragedy in human affairs (and the limitations of all rationality-based ethical systems) pushes the East into mysticism, asceticism, and hesychasm.

I have dedicated a lot of space to Aristotle's proposals, because of their influence on St Gregory Palamas' early philosophical development (as a student of Theodoros Metochites at the University of Constantinople around 1310). I wish to claim that asceticism and hesychasm, as practiced by St Gregory Palamas and his followers, was not only an attempt to live in a Christian way, observing the traditions of the Orthodox Fathers, but also the result of much thinking on the philosophical problems found in ancient Greek and Aristotelian ethics (I have discussed, in a similar and more specific way, the Stoic, the Epicurean and the Cynic ethical proposals in another work; see Athanasopoulos 2018). Let us examine in more detail some of the problems related to the Aristotelian concept of *eudaimonia*.

a) What is the exact relation of the virtues to *eudaimonia*? Can someone be *eudaimon* without actively engaging in virtuous behaviour? For Aristotle, virtuous activity appears important, but he also insists that *eudaimonia* is not a virtue of any particular kind and one can be virtuous without being *eudaimon*. Some have claimed that virtue is not important or *as important* as activity related to theoretical reason; someone can engage in an activity related to theoretical reason *without* being virtuous. Note, however, that this would cause a serious problem with our motivation for being virtuous (i.e., why be virtuous if one can achieve *eudaimonia* in other ways?). Kraut (1989), following Eastern Byzantine and Western mediaeval commentators, claims that, for Aristotle, in order to engage in theoretical reason we have to have lived a virtuous life and actively pursued virtue. If we have not achieved an active engagement with the virtues, we will not be able to actively engage in theoretical reason for

long (and a necessary requirement for Aristotle is that *eudaimonia* must have duration). But, Aristotle leaves this unclear and also associates *eudaimonia* with the existence of friends, family, and material goods, which are not related to theoretical reason and are not related to virtue as such. Furthermore, all material goods (including friends) can act against *eudaimonia*. Many early Christian philosophers and apologetics (following here the ethical arguments of the Stoics and the Cynics against the Peripatetic School) actually used this as a criticism against Aristotle (Μποζίνης 2017). St Gregory Palamas in relation to this issue would have gained detailed knowledge of the relevant arguments via his teacher Theodoros Metochites, who, as an established teacher of philosophy at the University of Constantinople, would have been an expert in the Byzantine commentaries on Aristotle. As such, St Gregory Palamas would have accepted some of the ethical arguments of the Stoics and the Cynics against Aristotle, agreeing with the Fathers of the Church that virtue does not need any material thing nor friendship to lead one to *eudaimonia* “ἡ ἀρετὴ αὐτάρκης ἐστὶν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν” (Μποζίνης 2017).

b) How important is recognition from others? Even though there is no dispute that his concept of *eudaimonia* is something objective, how important is recognition (i.e., of one's virtues, good character etc.) by others (a subjective and relativistic factor)? Kraut (ibid) thinks that this recognition is important, both psychologically (one feels good when admired and accepted by others), but also in terms of the objective basis of *eudaimonia*. However, we should note that the above-described problem of moral vulnerability, something Aristotle himself was aware of, makes the necessity of friends a serious problem for Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia*. Commentators in the East divide from the West here: The hesychastic and ascetic tradition that developed in the East to the point of being the East's predominant form of *anachoretic* monasticism attempted to distance the discussion about true *eudaimonia* from the existence of friends and material goods (see for example the Areopagite texts, the Fathers of the Desert, St John of Sinai and St Symeon the New Theologian). St Gregory Palamas, fully aware of these Aristotelian shortcomings, follows this (Eastern) anachoretic, ascetic and hesychastic tradition, particularly as it was developed in Holy Mt Athos by the Hesychasts residing there (who were Palamas' tutors during his early monastic life) and St Theoleptos of Philadelphia (ca.1250–1322), who was taught about hesychasm by St Nikephoros the Hesychast (13th c.) while he (St Theoleptos) was at Mt Athos.

c) Is *eudaimonia* an ongoing process or an evaluation at the final stage of life (or even a post-mortem evaluation)? Aristotle is not clear on

this. In places, he maintains that being alive is important for *eudaimonia* (because without it we cannot enjoy material goods). In other places, he goes against this (for example, because life pursuits provide obstacles to the full exercise of theoretical reasoning). So Aristotle himself leaves this problem unanswered. Commentators of the East and the West are divided on what could be the best solution for this problem. In the West, there is no clear indication either way (on what is the best interpretation of Aristotle on this issue). On the other hand, most of the Eastern Byzantine commentators claim that the best interpretation (that solves the problem) is that it should take place at the final stage and most concur on a post-mortem evaluation. It is this school of thought within which St Gregory Palamas was educated (by Theodoros Metochites), and this is why he would have considered both the Aristotelian problem and its solution in agreement with the Eastern commentators.

d) Is it related to rest or activity? In both the West and the East commentators are divided on this, and the Aristotelian corpus leaves this quite unclear, intensifying the problems related to *eudaimonia*. But, in the Mediaeval West, most commentators have interpreted Aristotle in an active way in terms of the commission of charitable works (see for example Aquinas' discussion of charity in *Summa Theologiae* in Second Part of the Second Part, Question 23, 'Charity considered in itself', and in First Part of the Second Part, Question 65 'The connection of the virtues'). This continuous active engagement with charitable works becomes constitutive of *eudaimonia* in an attempt to solve the problems associated with it. In the East, *eudaimonia* is related more to a state of well-being and bliss which comes about as the result of an activity (see the above discussion on the relation of virtue to *eudaimonia*). As such, most of the Eastern commentators around the time of Palamas saw a solution to the problems of Aristotelian *eudaimonia* more on the basis of contemplation and prayer, *ascesis* and *hesychia* (which are also the most distant from material goods and the recognition from one's friends).

e) What is the relation of *eudaimonia* to the gods? As indicated above, for most ancient Greeks *eudaimonia* (as a concept, especially when one looks at its etymology), is related to the ancient Greek gods. A person committing *hubris* against the gods would not be *eudaimon*. Up to the fifteenth century, there was unanimity among the commentators (in both the East and the West) that approval by the gods (or, for Christians, by the Christian God) was essential. From the time of the Enlightenment, however, there is very little discussion of this among non-Christian commentators of Aristotle. St Gregory Palamas would have used a Christian approach to Aristotelian *eudaimonia* (understanding it as a

situation where one is always on good terms with God). We have to note here that St Gregory Palamas (of course) would not accept the Aristotelian concept of god: Aristotle's god is motionless and inactive. Self-absorbed in *theoria* (νόησις νοήσεως), there is nothing that this god can do for anyone outside of god itself (Πεντζοπούλου-Βαλαλά 1994, p.135). For St Gregory Palamas, God is Triune and in agreement with the doctrine set out in the Byzantine Orthodox Creed (established and confirmed by the 7 Ecumenical Councils).

f) Inclusive of other elements or not? This problem relates to the tension between the formal and material definitions of *eudaimonia*. In the past, the West emphasised the exercise of theoretical reason (logic and metaphysics) as being most important for *eudaimonia*, to the point that a madman or someone with low mental abilities cannot be *eudaimon*; the East emphasised goodness as being more important (for the ontological, epistemological and ethical reasons behind such an outlook on life, see Athanasopoulos 2004). Currently, the debate is presented in different terms, and even the supporters of goodness (e.g., Kraut who accepts that virtue and good are essential for *eudaimonia*) do not emphasise the connection of goodness and *eudaimonia* to a relationship with God (i.e., one can be *eudaimon* and good without a particular belief in a god). But, as Aristotle showed in his *Politics*, it is extremely difficult to achieve *eudaimonia* in a corrupt *polis*. So, Aristotle, by concluding that all existent (for his time) forms of government are corrupt and by not allowing humans to live with *eudaimonia* outside a *polis*, has made it impossible to achieve *eudaimonia* in its formal and material definition (for consequences of this problem for Aristotle's views on friendship see McCoy 2013). This serious moral and political problem (how to reconcile the view about *eudaimonia* as expressed in the *Nicomachean Ethics* with the view on the *polis* as expressed in Aristotle's *Politics*) was all too evident to the Byzantine commentators and led some of the learned men of the Byzantine Empire (including St Gregory Palamas) to the conclusion that Aristotle's theories about *eudaimonia* were seriously flawed. This realisation nurtured their motivation to seek a Christian ascetic and hesychastic life and distance themselves from Aristotle's ethics.

Overall, as you can see in the above discussion of ancient Greek ethics there was a wider sense in Byzantine times of a disappointment with ancient Greek ethics as a whole and a thirst to find meaning in life that can provide some kind of a *philosophical* salvation. In Homer, we read this thirst as a thirst for glory through heroic acts, but also a realisation that this is not enough. In Plato, we read this thirst as a thirst for knowledge of forms, but also a realisation that, again, this is not enough in terms of

motivation. In Aristotle, we read this as a thirst for *eudaimonia*, but also a realisation that it cannot be reached due to its material definition and its parts that will always be unreachable or unclear in their proportions. But, before we continue with our investigation, we need to examine what we mean by the problem of *philosophical salvation*.

B. What do we mean by the problem of Salvation?

First, one may wonder why a philosopher should even consider salvation (a frequent topic in theological discussions) as a *philosophical* problem. To someone who is not familiar with Greek philosophy, this may seem a plausible question. But, as soon as one looks at the early Greek philosophical texts (Presocratics and/or Platonic), he immediately realises that this question is solely rhetorical in the case of the Greeks. We can consider here Plato (I am not going to discuss the Presocratics -one more obvious choice here- for reasons I mentioned previously). In the *Phaedo*, Socrates tells Cebes and Simias: “I am afraid that other people do not realize that the one aim of those who practice philosophy in the proper manner is to practice for dying and death” (*Phaedo*, 64a). Similarly, in *Theaetetus* the philosopher lives and sleeps only with his body in the city (*Theaet.* 173e) and what he should strive for is to make an escape from this world of corruption and death by becoming “as like God as possible” (176b). Furthermore, there is an implicit understanding that salvation for Plato involves liberation from the body (*Phaedrus* 246b-249a), which, even though a necessity, is considered corrupting and bad for the soul (*Phaedo* 66b-d; *Rep.* 611b-612a). In the *Republic*, we also have a discussion of the philosopher as saviour (σωτήρ), and Plato does indeed consider it the job of the philosopher to save the city and its people (*Republic* 549a-b; 463a-b; 502c-d; 583b; see some recent discussions on salvation in Plato in Adluri 2013 and Menn 2013).

However, even if for the Greeks this was a philosophical problem, why should more recent philosophers consider it as such? Well, because more recent philosophers *actually do consider* it a problem! See for example here, Santayana and Unamuno, who in their discussion of the tragic and its role in today’s philosophy, outline its role in our (philosophical) contemporary salvation (see Anton 2009). Schopenhauer, Heidegger, and Ricoeur have all been discussed in terms of providing paths to philosophical salvation (see Tongeren 2014; King 2005; Charley 2009). More recently, there has been significant discussion of the problem of philosophical salvation and its associated questions in relation to moral luck, the avoidance of birth and death, the choice of longevity, and how

questions explored in ancient Greek tragedy can help us solve, philosophically, the problems of the self (for instance see Williams 1981; Williams 1973; Critchley 2019).

I suggest three main principles in terms of how philosophers see the problem of salvation and its possible solutions: a) one can understand it as providing answers to the mystery of birth and death—in other words, finding a satisfactory metaphysical explanation about the necessity of one's birth and death and their metaphysical nature; b) one can understand this problem as the metaphysical and ethical explanation of why and how one can survive one's death and all the non-human factors that influence one's life; c) finally, one can see this problem as the need to find an answer to the question of why life has value.

In terms of the first principle, we find the ancient Greeks seeking to provide answers through religion and cosmology (support for this can be found in our Homeric discussion above), through philosophy (for this please return to our discussion on Plato and Aristotle) and ancient Greek drama, especially tragedy (see Critchley 2019; Havelock 1982; Jaeger 1986). Here, the Homeric appeared to be better than the other two stages in our exploration: it provided both answers as to why heroes are born and why they die. It also provided answers about what heroes are. In contrast, it fared very low in terms of the second principle: Achilles was not satisfied in death. It also fared very low in terms of the third principle in that a bitter aftertaste is left at the death of the hero. Plato's conception was better in terms of the second principle with a strong realisation that we are born to be good and we will survive death through our knowledge of the forms and our goodness. It fared very low in terms of the first (providing very little guidance as to why I, as a person, am born and then die). It also fared very low in terms of the third, failing to answer why we have human life as a parameter of existence at all. For Plato, life in the body is seen as punishment. But Plato does not provide a satisfactory answer to this question: what kind of value can such a punishment have for the person who lives it (and cannot remember why he has this punishment)? In Aristotle, we find a superb answer to the third principle. The experience of life in its richness and fullness becomes the most important aim in Aristotelian ethics and metaphysics. With *eudaimonia*, Aristotle solved the problem of salvation in terms of why life has value as it is, at the cost of providing answers to the other two: Aristotle cannot provide an answer to the question of why we have life and death, and he cannot provide an answer to the value of life (i.e., why should my life have more value than anyone else's or why have human life at all?) because the human soul for Aristotle is the form of the specific matter that is used to

make the human body and, in this way, this soul is lost at one's death. There was an attempt by Aristotle's followers in Hellenistic and Byzantine times (Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, and others; see Kessler 2011 and Todd 2014) to support the view that there is some kind of survival of a non-individualised intellectual part of the soul post-mortem (making full use of a relevant remark of Aristotle in *De Anima*, 428b), but it did not succeed in saving Aristotle's theory as such (see, for example, the attack of the late Byzantine commentator Georgios Gemistos or Plethon in Benakis 1974 and my more logical and metaphysical worries in Athanasopoulos 2010). Of course, all these debates offered plenty of useful arguments in proposing a Christian or theistic form of Aristotelianism in the Middle Ages (with examples that can be found among the Arabs, in the Mediaeval West and the Byzantine East). In Aristotle's solution to the problem of salvation, the lack of a soul means that the other two principles are not met: death is annihilation, so why should we live? The Stoics' response to this question came as a necessity in Greek ethics and metaphysics (I will not go into this here, because I must move on; I provide an examination of Stoic and Epicurean ethics contrasted with St Gregory Palamas in Athanasopoulos 2018).

From our investigation so far, it seems that the solution to the philosophical problem of salvation, as outlined above and within the Greek agenda of possible solutions, must have three components:

- a) It must be non-rationalist or at least contain non-rationalist elements (note my discussion above of how associating Kant, Hegel/Hegelians with the Greeks, esp. Homer, is a big mistake).
- b) Metaphysics is connected to and is one with ethics (this has a long history in philosophy: from the early Greek works of Homer and the Presocratics up to now). However, note that ontology and metaphysics cannot provide salvation alone; there is a necessity for appropriate ethics and politics.
- c) Other human discourses and endeavours having to do with *praxis* are relevant and should support the conclusions we need to make (for example, we may need to look beyond metaphysics and ethics, to epistemology and aesthetics to support our conclusions: see our discussion above about the role of *Poetics* in the Aristotelian corpus).

C. Ludwig Wittgenstein on Language/Cultural Games as Forms of Life: Religion and Ethics

At this point, it is useful to see how Ludwig Wittgenstein's views fit within the framework of our discussion and especially our contemporary

understanding of religious discourse, in answer to the question of salvation. We will start with the problem of how one can be certain about the source of salvation: God.

Overall, there has been a major division between the Wittgenstein Fideists (for example, Nielsen in Nielsen and Phillips 2005; Malcolm 1977, 1993) and those opposing them (for example, Phillips in Nielsen and Phillips 2005; Martin 1990). Due to the brief nature of my investigation, I will focus here only on some of these debates and try to establish some key points that will become useful in terms of making a comparison with the views of St Gregory Palamas at the next step of my investigation.

In Wittgensteinian scholarship, the debate remains as to whether there is continuity or division between his earlier works (most notably the *Tractatus* and *Notebooks*) and the later ones (most importantly for our purposes, the *Philosophical Investigations*, from here on known as PI, *On Certainty* or OC, and *Culture and Value* or CV). I will begin by outlining what I take to be the strongest points in the discussion of language games in later Wittgenstein and try to gain a deeper understanding of his perspective through a comparison with his early views.

In a perspective like Wittgenstein's, there is a cohesive totality in the understanding of reality upon which belief (including religious belief) is based. He calls this "the system" in OC. In opposition to most empiricists, Wittgenstein believes that "doubt comes after belief" (OC, 160). This is because any kind of testing, confirmation or disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place within a system, i.e., first, you need to have this system and then you can test it. He also believes that this is not an arbitrary starting point: the argument or a question that causes the argument cannot arise without this system and the life of the argument is given by the system (OC, 105). Both justification (of the system and its parts) and testing, at some point, must come to an end (OC, 192, 164). Similarly, he believes that a language game (i.e., a non-rigid rule-based human linguistic interaction, which may take the form of a primitive game, like the builders' discussion with only four words and their combination (see PI, 2), or more advanced like religious or philosophical discourse) is only possible if one has access to this "system" and its beliefs; only if one "trusts something" (OC, 509). This brings us to Wittgenstein's views on the language game being a "form of life". Language is an activity for Wittgenstein that necessitates agreement in practice and use. This constitutes a form of life, where the specific language game under consideration can grow, develop, and mutate, as well as die. Note that this is not a biological form of life, but it shares certain key characteristics with it. For the participant in a specific language game,

there may be other forms of life that can be imagined or may be intelligible, and some discourse in these may be possible, but it is not reliable, neither certain, nor predictable; it cannot have explanatory power, nor can it be accurate (see PI, 19, 23, 241, p.174, 226; Hunter 1968).

This brings us to a famous saying of Wittgenstein: “if the lion could talk we would not understand it” (PI, 223). What are we to make of this? Suppose we know the intentions of the lion, could we understand what the lion says? For Wittgenstein, we would have a negative answer, because these intentions would create further problems, which are similar to the beetle-in-a-box problem that he discusses in PI, 293 (however, note the complexity of Wittgenstein’s argument and the problems with the various interpretations regarding the privacy of these intentions; see Philip 1993 and Mulhall 2006). If we know the syntax and grammatical rules of its language, could we understand it? Again, for Wittgenstein, the answer would be ‘no’, because to know and understand the application of the rules, would mean that one has to already know how to play the language game (these worries have become known as rule-following problems, as outlined primarily by Kripke 1982 and challenged by Wright 1989; McDowell 1984, 1991; Diamond 1991). Some have suggested that the situation might be different if we know the “hinges” upon which the game is played (OC 341, 343, 655). If we know these hinges, which are important rules and facts that are admitted as certain grounds for the linguistic practice and without which we cannot play the game, can we understand the language of the lion? Again Wittgenstein would most likely answer ‘no’. There are many problems here; we do not only have problems regarding the compatibility of the lion’s hinges’ with ours, but we also need to be clear regarding what we take to actually be the hinges and how they are different from intentions and syntactical or grammatical rules (see Orr 1989; Moyal-Sharrock 2013; Pritchard 2017). The issue is further complicated by the acceptance that the lion speaks. If the lion speaks, then surely, we *must* be able to understand it! The careful reader of Wittgenstein would be very hesitant about this; that we recognise a gesture, a movement of the lips or a series of sounds coming out of the mouth of an entity as someone talking does not mean that we also recognise in this our ability to understand this form of communication. Some commentators see, in relation to this, a continuity with Wittgenstein’s earlier views on mysticism (*Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* 7: “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence”). Wittgenstein’s emphasis on remaining silent (the term often used here is *quietude*) regarding things that we know exist, but that we do not know how we come to understand them as such, in both his early and late

philosophy, have made many commentators characterise him as a mystic. According to Maurice Blanchot (Blanchot 1986, pp.10-11): “Wittgenstein’s ‘mysticism’, aside from his faith in unity, must come from his believing that one *can show* when *one cannot speak*. But without language, nothing can be shown. Silence is impossible. That is why we desire it. Writing (or telling) precedes every phenomenon, every manifestation or show: all appearing”. Indeed, Wittgenstein terms “inexpressible” a large part of what we could consider being non-expressible linguistic conventions that make our language have meaning: “Perhaps what is inexpressible (What I find mysterious and am not able to express) is the background against which whatever I could express has its meaning” (CV, 16e). Some other philosophers discussing these views of Wittgenstein think that at least some of the ineffable insights as found in aesthetic, religious, and philosophical contexts, are best understood in terms of self-acquaintance, which might be a particular kind of non-propositional knowledge (Jonas 2016). But, if this is so, what kind of epistemic value might this kind of non-propositional knowledge have? How do I know that this non-propositional knowledge can indeed be understood by me if I cannot speak about it? Also, there is an implicit presumption in this approach that I *can* know myself (and know even things that I *cannot* know about myself). Something that Wittgenstein would find rather presumptuous and indefensible (for a similar criticism on Jonas’ work, see Ward 2016).

The proposal of a self-exploratory non-propositional knowledge would be very close to some kind of private language argument (“The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know—to his immediate private sensations. So, another person cannot understand the language” PI par. 243), which Wittgenstein severely criticises in PI (Wittgenstein criticises many aspects of the private language argument in PI: privacy, identity, inner/outer relations, sensations as objects, and sensations as justification for talking about sensation, see PI par. 243-315). I can only briefly mention this here, but I hope I will be able to develop my views on this further in another work. For now, suffice it to say that most of the commentators on Wittgenstein would suggest that he is against the idea that there can exist any discussion or language, which in principle is unintelligible to anyone but its originating speaker (note, however, that commentators disagree on the structure of this argument; see Baker 1998; Canfield 2001, pp.377-9; Stroud 2000).

If you are a philosopher in the analytic tradition and are favourable to Wittgenstein’s intuitions about language and meaning, you would find that the above issues in relation to the lion speaking to us and Wittgenstein’s mysticism (both early and later on) are directly relevant to

the discussion of the communication between humans and God in the work of St Symeon the New Theologian and St Gregory Palamas, which we are going to discuss next. The issue would be similar to the predicament we have with the lion: suppose God was to speak to you. Could you understand Him? On what would you base your understanding? Verbally expressed intentions? In the past, these have produced many historical misreadings that have led people into tragic events, involving death, violence, and pain (a famous recent example from the context of social and political life is ex-American President Bush's direct communications with God; see MacAskill 2005). What about prior textual evidence alone? Again, this is insufficient. Textual evidence alone has led past theologians into various disagreements and heresies, which have also led to death, violence and pain (for example, we can look into the history of Christianity in its first six centuries and the proliferation of Protestant groups in the last four centuries and the violence, death and destruction that "textual evidence" has brought into the world...). Would personal direct experience/communication (something you know you have, but which you cannot describe how you came to have it) fare better? This would be the only plausible candidate (unless you follow the views of someone like Martin 1990, who I am not going to discuss here due to shortage of space; note also that we are not discussing cases of mental abnormality and psychopathology; I discuss this in relation to St Symeon the New Theologian's views later on). Immediately, we can see that a philosopher who is sympathetic to Wittgenstein would find the idea that there could be direct experience and communication (including non-verbal communication) and some sense of certainty in the meaning of this communicative experience attractive; this would be attractive, for the main reason that it would avoid the lack of certainty, "hinge" based criteria and self-exploratory non-propositional knowledge that have attracted criticism and never-ending discussion among Wittgenstein's sympathisers.

However, before we proceed into the investigation of St Symeon the New Theologian and St Gregory Palamas, it is interesting to examine Wittgenstein's views on ethics, because they are of particular interest to the topic of philosophical salvation.

In his early work, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, and his *Lecture on Ethics*, we find Wittgenstein's most characteristic remarks: In *Tractatus* 6.421, he notes the transcendental and inexpressible nature of ethics and that, in this, ethics and aesthetics are one. By this, he probably means that both ethics and aesthetics are not able to be expressed in propositions (his preferred mode of linguistic expression), and, in this way, they cannot be logically analysed and be part of a logical argument.

This idea is further supported in his *Lecture on Ethics*, where he maintains that the realm of ethics is something that belongs to the supernatural and has nothing to do with facts, which are his primary concern (*Lecture on Ethics*, p.40). This opposition to some earlier views regarding the possibility of moral science and ethics (as able to have some kind of naturalistic and/or scientific aims) is further supported by his later remarks. In *Lectures and Conversations* (par. 18-21), we find Wittgenstein trying to explain what we mean by appreciation (a fundamental aspect of what we do when we morally appraise actions). He notes that something similar takes place when going to a tailor's shop, as we are able to differentiate between: a) people who know about suits and b) people who do not. We immediately recognise them as belonging to one of these two categories, with no further need for explanation and/or questioning. One may feel the need to ask for a further explanation, but Wittgenstein here would be unable to provide any, because, as he would ask, "what kind of an explanation here would satisfy us"?

Note the relevance of our earlier remarks regarding mysticism, the ineffable, and the impossibility of using intentions and private language in all this. We must also note that he is not saying that [ethical] appreciation does not exist, nor that it is difficult to recognise. This positive attitude towards the special nature of moral appraisal is further augmented by a remark in *Culture and Value* where Wittgenstein maintains that ethical teaching cannot simply be reduced to training (*Culture and Value*, p.93). With our short investigation into the work of Wittgenstein, we can see a very concrete example of a philosophical discourse (having to do with ethics and aesthetics), which further supports our discussion regarding the immediate recognizability of our direct experience with God, as proposed by the hesychastic fathers and particularly St Gregory Palamas. Within the philosophical framework of Wittgenstein, one of the key 20th-century British-Austrian philosophers with many followers today, it is possible to have direct experience of God; it is also possible to be certain about it in a direct way, which does not necessitate epistemological justification especially in terms of rational and widely recognizable, non-culture specific ("objective") criteria (for the distinct cultural context of Eastern mysticism as exemplified by St Gregory Palamas see Athanasopoulos 2012).

D. Hesychasm and St Gregory Palamas

Our examination of St Gregory Palamas' views need start with the influence he received from St Symeon the New Theologian and,

especially, the mystical and hesychastic tendencies in his work. St Gregory Palamas not only accepts the views of St Symeon the New Theologian, but develops them further and contextualises them in his debates with Varlaam of Calabria.

But, what do we mean by *hesychia* (ἡσυχία)? *Hesychia* or *hesychasm* (with its derivative *hesychast*) (ἡσυχία - ἡσυχασμός- ἡσυχαστής) is not, and cannot simply be translated as, “stillness”, “rest”, or “quietude” (which are some usual translations of the term in English). This is because, as a concept, it has nothing to do with expressions such as “born still”, “I am resting”, and “you remain quiet”. *Hesychia* is not related to the passivity that these words and expressions indicate. It is more directed to an active and dynamic condition within which the *hesychast* is pursuing a union with God (see for more on this in the Mantzarides paper contained in this collection). Hesychasm, as an approach, relates to a distinct episode in the development of Orthodox monasticism and traces its origins to the early Desert Fathers (note that Professor Mantzarides claims here that there is both biblical and wider patristic support for hesychasm; see his paper in this collection). We have evidence that it was more or less developed in the form we see it today during the tenth to the thirteenth centuries through the works of St Symeon the New Theologian, Nicephoros the Hesychast, St Gregory Palamas and St Gregory of Sinai (their work forms an integral part of the texts of the *Philokalia* which the Palamas Seminar will discuss in detail in 2019-2021). In St Gregory Palamas’ development of *hesychasm*, we find a union of *praxis* (or practical philosophy- *πρακτική φιλοσοφία*) and *theoria* (*θεωρία*), terms that have their philosophical origins in Plato and the Presocratics (see more on this in my Introduction in this collection). With the works of the Desert Fathers, the Cappadocians (in particular St Gregory of Nyssa), and later patristic uses (for example, St Maximus the Confessor) these terms have gained strict and quite rich and complex Christian theological connotations. We have here a dynamic and multifaceted union of asceticism and mysticism, which is unique and distinct from other similar attempts in the history of philosophy or history of religion.

One can see in St Gregory Palamas’ hesychasm an adoption, further development and interplay between two key positions of St Gregory of Nyssa: a) his conviction that true knowledge of God can only be mystical (a position which was adopted by St Symeon the New Theologian in his mystical theology) and b) his insistence that true knowledge of God can only be achieved in stillness (*hesychia*); this position was further developed in St Maximus the Confessor’s endless motion of love (see Chivou 2009; Μουτσούλα 1965; Μπούκη 1970;

Μαντζαρίδη 1963). Taking into consideration this complex and multifaceted nature of the term, it is better to keep it as *hesychia* (transliterated and not translated, i.e., as a technical term). As we shall see, Palamas' attitude on hesychia and asceticism is a result of a) his understanding of the patristic ascetic and mystical treatises on *hesychia* (from St Gregory of Nyssa, St Maximus the Confessor, St Symeon the New Theologian and others) and b) his monastic and spiritual experience as a student and follower of Theoliptos Metropolitan of Philadelphia (c.1250-1322) and Nicephoros the Hesychast (13th c.) who, according to Palamas, codified the method of prayer outlined in St Symeon the New Theologian's *Three Methods of Prayer*. Palamas mentions both Theoliptos and Nicephoros, together with St Symeon the New Theologian in his *Triads* expressing great admiration and highlighting their influence on his ascetic and hesychastic perspective. I will focus here on St Symeon the New Theologian before moving on to St Gregory Palamas.

St Symeon the New Theologian (949-1022) was a Byzantine Orthodox Christian monk of Constantinople who was one of the three given the name "Theologian" *post-mortem*. The other two were St John, the Disciple and Apostle of Jesus (6-100), and St Gregory of Nazianzus (c.329-390, who was Bishop of Nazianzus and Archbishop of Constantinople and a firm supporter of the Nicene Creed: in 381, he led the 3rd Ecumenical Council against Arianism before resigning from the throne of Constantinople and retiring to Nazianzus). St Symeon the New Theologian influenced St Gregory Palamas (together with other mystic Orthodox theologians of the middle and late Byzantine era) in two ways: firstly, by providing a superb way of uniting *praxis* and *theoria*, asceticism and mysticism, in a seamless and dynamically interconnected way (where talking about ascetic struggle is intertwined with mystical experience and mystical vision that confirms the validity of the ascetic existence, see Alfeyev 2000); and secondly, through St Symeon's insistence on the priority of the lived mystical experience as the proper method for knowledge of God (and with *hesychia* as a necessary pre-requisite for this mystical experience). This unique union of asceticism and mysticism went against the position of a significant portion of Byzantine theologians and philosophers and most of their Western mediaeval colleagues.

St Symeon, in the 15th oration of his work *Ethical Orations* entitled "On hesychia and the work (*ἐργασία*) of the one who perseveres with courage in it" (*Sources Chrétiennes* 1967, vol. 129), presents the hesychast (*hesychazon* note that he uses here the present participle of the verb *ἡσυχάζω*) as one of the students of Christ at Mt Tabor, who have witnessed with their own eyes the Transfiguration, the transformation of

the clothing, and the witness of the Father.

The hesychasts (*hesychazontes*) for St Symeon the New Theologian, like the students of Christ on Mt Thabor, recognize the Holy Trinity and the desire to remain within the divine realm, making a solemn determination to cleanse and “make new” their minds (*νοῦς*), soul (*ψυχή*) and body (*σῶμα*; referring to the three tenets mentioned in the relevant part of the gospels), through the cultivation of the virtues and prayer. Proceeding along this line of interpretation of the relevant scriptural passage, he sees the *hesychast* as an exemplification of the Apostles in Pentecost: a) situated in a mystically elevated space, waiting for the reception; b) teaching and interpreting the Gospel; and c) refuting the arguments raised against the teachings of the Holy Spirit.

St Symeon sees the *hesychazon* (*hesychazon*) also as an exemplification of Moses: a) going high and within the cloud, hidden from the public; b) seeing not just the back of God, but also the face of God, and also listening and talking to God; c) first approaches the mysteries of God, then the law of God which he delivers to the people, then receiving the light of the light, and being thus, full of light, goes and passes on some of the mercy he has received through his actions to others; d) by asking, he receives, and by receiving he passes on to others, freeing others from the ties of evil and misfortune.

Finally, he suggests that the *hesychazon* is like the other apostles, although he should not be like doubting Thomas. By this, he means that even though the *hesychazon* is locked away from the world, he should be without fear once Christ visits him; his fear and trembling towards God should only be during the reception of the Holy Spirit. The *hesychazon* should touch, with the hands of the mind, the wounds of Christ and through the reception of his senses the mystery of the Resurrected Christ, being always watchful and careful to distinguish between true enlightenment and false or imaginary enlightenment.

St Symeon the New Theologian insists that this continuous check (of how and if the works of the *hesychazon* follow the true and direct experience the hesychast has of God) is by necessity an on-going task and requires the constant care of an experienced spiritual father who will guide and assist when necessary (see for the important role of a spiritual father in St Symeon’s ascetic and hesychastic treatises, the relevant discussions of Taylor 1990; Golitzin 1997, esp. pp.59-60). This need for external supervision on the mystical experiences of the *hesychazontes* is not just because of the limitations of rationality itself (an issue St Symeon discusses often in his writings, attacking early mediaeval scholastic theology for its dependence on the role of reason in approaching God, see

McInnes 2012). There is also the reason of the spiritual dimension of the *praxis* of the hesychast: if there is no such continuous check, then, St Symeon asks, “in what sense and for what exactly reason is the monk keeping himself in the cell”? The mind (*nous*) is immaterial and does not need material confinements to approach the divine. If one thinks that just by keeping oneself secluded he can approach the divine, St Symeon insists, he is deluded: rest and stillness can be turned into an evil, if not placed constantly within the appropriate context of *hesychia*. If the one who is *hesychazon* (or he has the responsibility of overseeing the progress of the ones who are *hesychazontes*), does not follow this path of continuous examination, he does not know the path he walks on and leads himself and others into destruction and eternal fire. St Symeon, using his long monastic experience, warns that the one who teaches *hesychazontes* to follow an unexamined path is a liar and a deceiver, leading others and himself into destruction and eternal damnation.

St Gregory Palamas (1296-1359) further develops this profound way of uniting *praxis* and *theoria* (asceticism and mysticism) in a seamless and dynamically interconnected way with his defence of hesychasm against the attacks of Varlaam of Calabria (1290-1348). He finds that the key to this defence is to acknowledge the role of the body in the process of purification. The soul, the mind and the body become one in this process and any kind of dualism is rendered obsolete. In his *Triads* (“Defence of the Hesychasts”, Question 1, Answer 2; see Χρήστου 1962, vol. 2, p.120), he maintains that the *hesychazontes* (notice here the influence of St Symeon the New Theologian even on the use of the exact form of the term) need to gather their self and primarily their thoughts within their body and in particular the body within their body, which the hesychasts call the “heart” (τῷ ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδοτάτῳ σώματι, ὃ καρδίαν ὀνομάζομεν). For Palamas, a certain way of achieving this gathering and focusing of thoughts is to check thoroughly all parts of one’s soul and one’s mind, so that nothing is hidden in one’s heart (μὴ ψυχῆς μέρος, μὴ μέλος σώματος ἀνεπίσκοπον ἐάσης). St Gregory Palamas insists that it is only with this constant striving in the focusing and gathering of thoughts that the cleansing process of all human faculties and ceaseless praying of the Jesus Prayer (“Lord Jesus Christ save me, a sinner” or Κύριε Ἰησοῦ Χριστέ, Υἱὲ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐλέησόν με τον ἁμαρτωλόν) in one’s heart can be achieved. Fasting and *ascesis* here become worthless unless put into the service of mystical union with God. Going into the metaphysics of this process, he insists that the energy of prayer cannot be concentrated and become appealing to God unless the mind’s and soul’s energies are first focused and concentrated in the heart (Χρήστου 1962, vol. 2, pp.121-134).

There is a need to transform the body into a place, where God's presence and the energy of the Holy Spirit can dwell (ἡ σὰρξ μετασκευαζομένη συναννυοῦται τε καὶ συναπολαύει τῆς θείας κοινωνίας καὶ κτῆμα καὶ αὐτὴ γίνεται καὶ οἶκημα Θεοῦ -Χρήστου 1962, vol. 2, pp.138-140).

This is where he finds Varlaam's accusation against the hesychasts (basically that they are *omfalopsychous* or *ὀμφαλοψύχους*, i.e., that they try to concentrate their souls in their navels), is a wrong interpretation of what hesychasm is all about and far from the true aims of the *hesychastic* pursuits. The heart (esp. what St Gregory Palamas and the hesychasts call "heart") is not related to a specific area in the material body and most certainly it is not the navel. The concentration that St Gregory Palamas and the hesychasts talk about is not in any part of the body *as it is*, but it is focused on the *transformed body* that is called "*the heart*". Palamas sees in Varlaam's poor attempt to criticise the hesychastic practice a blatant disregard of both the history and the development of hesychastic practice (Palamas discusses in his treatise the details of how Theoliptos of Philadelphia and Nicephoros the Hesychast influenced this development; see Χρήστου 1962, vol. 2, pp.141-143). Following this line of thinking, the Declaration of the monks of Holy Mt Athos (Ἀγιορειτικὸς Τόμος), St Gregory Palamas affirms this need for a transformation of the body, so that it can unite with the soul and the mind; he insists that only through this transformation can the body lose the animosity of the flesh towards the soul that was accepted by ancient Greek metaphysics, scholastic interpretations of Aristotle and Varlaam's (and his followers) approach to salvation (ἡ σὰρξ μετασκευαζομένη συναννυοῦται τε καὶ συναπολαύει τῆς θείας κοινωνίας καὶ κτῆμα καὶ αὐτὴ γίνεται καὶ οἶκημα Θεοῦ, μηκέτ' ἐνοικουροῦσαν ἔχουσα τὴν πρὸς Θεὸν ἔχθραν, μηδέ κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐπιθυμοῦσα).

There is an epistemological certainty in the Declaration in the claims made about the process that St Gregory Palamas depicts: the Fathers of Holy Mt Athos stress in their Declaration that they have spoken themselves to the saints who managed to unite with God and who got their bodies transformed via the energies they received from God. As such, they (the monastic community) can indeed be certain that the hesychast fathers have indeed seen God. It is this epistemological certainty that makes Varlaam's sceptical epistemological, metaphysical and ethical attacks on the hesychasts the product of delusion and an intellectual and mental disease (τύφος): *Ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἁγίων ἐκείνων ἔστιν οἷς αὐτοπροσώπως ὠμιλήσαμεν καὶ διδασκάλοις ἐχρησάμεθα. Πῶς οὖν, τούτους παρ' οὐδὲν θέμενοι, τοὺς καὶ πείρα καὶ χάριτι δεδιδαγμένους, τοῖς ἀπὸ τύφου καὶ λογομαχίας ἐπὶ τό διδάσκειν χωρήσασιν εἴζομεν; Οὐκ ἔσται τοῦτο, οὐκ*

ἔσται (Χρήστου 1962, vol. 2, p.144).

Conclusions

From the above examination, we can see that the language of hesychasm (as developed by the Cappadocian and Eastern Mystical Fathers, like St Symeon the New Theologian and St Gregory Palamas) has a life of its own. It has very little to do with other linguistic forms of life (such as the language of mediaeval Scholasticism). Attempts to find similarities between key hesychastic figures and the masters of mediaeval Scholasticism have been many, both in the past and more recently. Such attempts, however, have been and are liable to failure due to the dual aims and dependency of hesychasm on both *praxis* and *theoptia*, mysticism and asceticism. To flourish and reach its aims, hesychasm needs discipline and obedience to a spiritual father who can discern true progress or regression in the development of the hesychast novice. A continuous return to the heart (which for the hesychasts is not located in a particular part of the body) and examination of the innermost thoughts should also be a neverending process. The language used to describe this process was born in the work of the early Fathers of the Desert and came to maturity in the works of St Symeon the New Theologian and St Gregory Palamas. It continues to grow and develop for as long as there are hesychasts (some unknown to the many, still living in remote caves of Holy Mt Athos and other hesychastic centres of Eastern monasticism). It is very difficult to know or sense the unique character of hesychasm for researchers outside the tradition within which it flourishes. But it can be recognised and sensed fully within the tradition that has produced it. This way of understanding Eastern hesychastic mysticism and asceticism and its goals in (philosophical and theological) salvation is relevant and useful to philosophical research into salvation and philosophical approaches to communicating with God (especially to researchers influenced by Wittgenstein).

In our investigation, we found that both discussions regarding the problems found in the ancient Greek agenda on the need of ontological salvation and contemporary philosophical (metaphysical, epistemological, ethical) debates regarding the ineffable, meaning intentions and hinges (as mentioned in the work of Wittgenstein) point to the greatness of the solutions provided in the work of Palamas. Without hesychasm, our culture would be greatly impoverished. It would most probably deny itself a very plausible approach to salvation; one that is achieved by heroically confronting one's weaknesses and limitations; one that is recognising the

need for the dependence on God who cannot be rationally understood and whose existence is beyond the bounds of modern science and its myopic insistence on comprehensibility, predictability, and testability. We need to be mindful of the weakness of science in relation to God, especially now that science is all powerful and permeates all aspects of our social behaviour. In relation to this, it is by no accident that Wittgenstein attacked scientism and noted that over-reliance on science puts philosophy and our cognitive powers to sleep (“Man has to awaken to wonder. . . . Science is a way of sending him to sleep again”; see Wittgenstein 1980, p. 5; Beale and Kidd, 2017).

List of Sources cited

- Adluri, Vishwa, 2013, “Philosophy, Salvation, and the Mortal Condition” in *Philosophy and salvation in Greek religion*, by Vishwa Adluri, ed., De Gruyter, pp.1-27.
- Alfeyev, Hilarion, *St. Symeon the New Theologian and Orthodox Tradition*, Oxford: OUP 2000.
- Anton, John, 2009, “Santayana, Unamuno, and the concept of the tragic”, *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 45.4, pp.689-706.
- Anton, Charles, 1860, *A new classical dictionary of Greek and Roman biography, mythology and geography: partly based upon the Dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology by William Smith*, N.Y.: Harper.
- Apressyan, Ruben, 2014, “Homeric Ethics: Prospective Tendencies”, in Hardy and Rudebusch, 2014, pp.67-84.
- Athanasopoulos, C., 2004, “The influence of Ps.Dionysius the Areopagite on Johannes Scotus Eriugena and St. Gregory Palamas: Goodness as Transcendence of Metaphysics”, in Agnieszka Kijewska, ed., *Being or Good? Metamorphoses of Neoplatonism*, Lublin: Catholic University of Lublin Press (KUL), pp.319-341.
- Athanasopoulos, C., 2010, “Ousia in Aristotle’s Categories”, *Logique et Analyse*, 53 (210), pp.211-243.
- Athanasopoulos, C., 2011, “What Nicholas D. Smith has got wrong about Homeric Ethics”, in *Teaching and Research in the Arts: Papers from the Arts Faculty Conference held at the New Lanark Mill Hotel, October 2010 and October 2011*, The Open University, 2012, pp.3-14.
- Athanasopoulos, C., 2012, “The Validity and Distinctness of the Orthodox Mystical Approach in Philosophy and Theology and Its Opposition to ‘Esse ipsum subsistens’”, *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, 68, 4, pp.695-714.

- Athanasopoulos, C., 2018, “*Eudaimonia, Apatheia, Ataraxia and Hesychasm: How St Gregory Palamas’ views on hesychasm and asceticism solve the problems in the often misunderstood ancient Greek moral concepts of eudaimonia, apatheia and ataraxia*”, *Analogia: The Pemptousia Journal for Theological Studies*, Vol. 5, pp. 5-18.
- Beale, J., and Kidd, I. J., 2017, *Wittgenstein and Scientism*, Routledge.
- Baker, G. P., 1998, “The private language argument”, *Language & Communication*, 18, pp. 325-56.
- Benakis, Linos (Μπενάκης, Λίνος), 1974, «Πλήθωνος, ‘Πρὸς ἡρωτημένα ἅττα ἀπόκρισις’. (Για το αριστοτελικό αξίωμα της αντιφάσεως και για τη σύνθετη φύση του ανθρώπου). Πρώτη έκδοση με Εισαγωγή και νεοελληνική μετάφραση», *Φιλοσοφία* 4, pp. 330-376.
- Blanchot, Maurice, 1986, *Writing of the Disaster*, tr. Ann Smock, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Bobonich, C., 2002, *Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics*, Oxford: OUP.
- Brickhouse, Thomas, and Smith, Nicholas, 2007, “Socrates on Akrasia, Knowledge, and the Power of Appearance”, in Christopher Bobonich and Pierre Destrée, eds., *Akrasia in Greek Philosophy: From Socrates to Plotinus*, Brill, pp. 1-18.
- Brickhouse, Thomas, and Smith, Nicholas, 2010, *Socratic Moral Psychology*, Cambridge: CUP.
- Bussanich, John, 2013, “Rebirth Eschatology in Plato and Plotinus”, in *Philosophy and salvation in Greek religion*, by Vishwa Adluri, ed., De Gruyter, pp. 243-288.
- Canfield, J. V., 2001, ‘Private language: the diary case’, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 79, pp. 377–94.
- Charley Mejame Ejede, 2009, “Problematic of technology and the realms of salvation in Heidegger’s philosophy”, *Forum Philosophicum*, 14, pp. 343-367.
- Chivou, C. E., 2009, *Θεολογία, θεοπτία και θέωση, από τον Άγιο Συμεών στον Άγιο Γρηγόριο τον Παλαμά, Διδακτορική Διατριβή, Θεσσαλονίκη*.
- Cooper, John, M., 2004, *Knowledge, Nature and the Good*, Princeton and Oxford: PUP.
- Critchley, Simon, 2019, *Tragedy, the Greeks and Us*, London: Profile Books.
- Diamond, C., 1991, *The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind*, London: The MIT Press.
- Dobbs, Darrell, 2003, “Plato’s Paragon of Human Excellence: Socratic Philosopher and Civic Guardian”, *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 65, No.

4, pp. 1062-1082.

Dodds, Eric R., 1962, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

DuBois, Edward C., 2014, "Does Happiness Die With Us? An Aristotelian Examination of the Fortunes of the Deceased", *Journal of Philosophy of Life*, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 28-37.

Duncan, Christopher and Stienberger, Peter, 1990, "Plato's Paradox? Guardians and Philosopher-Kings", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 84(4), pp. 1317-1322.

Firestone Chris L., and Palmquist, Stephen, eds., 2006, *Kant and the new philosophy of religion*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Golitzin, A., 1997, *On the Mystical Life: The Ethical Discourses*, St. Vladimir Press, Crestwood.

Hardy, Jörg, and Rudebusch, George, eds., 2014, *Ancient Ethics*, V&R UniPress.

Hare, J., 2011, "Ethics and Religion: Two Kantian Arguments", *Philosophical Investigations*, Vol. 34(2), pp. 151-168.

Hunter, J. F. M., 1968, "Forms of Life" in Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations", *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Oct., 1968), pp. 233-243.

Havelock, E.A., 1982, *The Literate Revolution in Greece and its Cultural Consequences* (Princeton Series of Collected Essays), Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Irwin, T., *Plato's Ethics*, 1995, Oxford: OUP.

Irwin, Terence, 2007, *The development of ethics: a historical and critical study*, Volume 1: From Socrates to the Reformation, Oxford: OUP.

Jaeger, Werner, 2003, *The Theology of Early Greek Philosophers*, The Gifford Lectures 1936, Oxford: OUP.

Johansen, K. F., 1998, *A history of Ancient Philosophy*, transl. by H. Rosenmeier, London: Routledge.

Jonas, Silvia, 2016, *Ineffability and its Metaphysics: The Unspeakable in Art, Religion, and Philosophy*, London: Palmgrave-Macmillan.

Jaeger, Werner, 1986, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture Volume I: Archaic Greece: The Mind of Athens, Vol. 1*, Oxford: OUP.

Kant, Immanuel, 1793, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft*.

Kessler, E., 2011, *Alexander of Aphrodisias and his doctrine of the soul: 1400 years of lasting significance*, Leiden: Brill.

King, Andrew, 2005, "Philosophy and Salvation: The apophatic in the thought of Arthur Schopenhauer", *Modern Theology*, 21:2, pp. 253-274.

- Kraut, Richard, 1989, *Aristotle on the Human Good*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- MacAskill, Ewan, 2005, “George Bush: ‘God told me to end the tyranny in Iraq’”, *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/oct/07/iraq.usa> (accessed 20/09/2019).
- Malcolm, N., 1977, “The Groundlessness of Belief”, in S. C. Brown (ed.), *Reason and Religion*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 143-57.
- Malcolm, Norman, 1993, *Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Martin, Michael, 1990, *Atheism: A Philosophical Justification*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Μαντζαρίδη Γ. Ι., 1963, *Η περί Θεώσεως του Ανθρώπου διδασκαλία Γρηγορίου του Παλαμά*, διδ. Διατριβή, Θεσσαλονίκη.
- McCoy, Marina Berzins, 2013, *Wounded Heroes: Vulnerability as a Virtue in Ancient Greek Literature and Philosophy*, Oxford: OUP.
- McDowell, John, 1984, “Wittgenstein on following a rule”, *Synthese* 58, pp. 325-363.
- McDowell, John, 1991, “Intentionality and interiority in Wittgenstein”, in *Meaning Scepticism*, edited by Klaus Puhl, Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 148-169.
- McInnes, Jim, 2012, “A Byzantine Theodidact: Symeon the New Theologian's Claim to Be Taught by God”, *Journal of Medieval Religious Cultures*, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 193-210.
- Menn, Stephen, 2013, “Plato’s Soteriology?” in *Philosophy and salvation in Greek religion*, ed. by Vishwa Adluri, ed., De Gruyter, pp.191-216.
- Moyal-Sharrock, D., 2013, “On Coliva’s Judgmental Hinges,” *Philosophia*, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 13–25.
- Μουτσούλα Η. Δ., 1965, *Η Σάρκωσις του λόγου και η θέωσις του Ανθρώπου κατά την διδασκαλίαν Γρηγορίου Νύσσης*, Διδ. Διατριβή, Αθήναι.
- Μποζίνη, Κων., 2017, “Οι τα απο του περιπάτου φιλοσοφούντες: η κριτική πρόσληψη του αριστοτελισμού από την αρχαία εκκλησία”, στο *Πρακτικά Διεθνούς Επιστ. Συνεδρίου “Αριστοτέλης και Χριστιανισμός”*, Θεολογική Σχολή ΕΚΠΑ, σ. 81-95.
- Μπούκη Χ., 1970, *Η Γλώσσα του Γρηγορίου Νύσσης*, εκδ. Πατριαρχικού Ιδρύματος Πατερικών Μελετών, Θεσσαλονίκη.
- Mulhall, Stephen, 2006, *Wittgenstein’s Private Language: Grammar, Nonsense and Imagination in Philosophical Investigations*, §§ 243–315, Oxford: OUP.

- Nehamas, A., 2010, "Aristotelian *Philia*, Modern friendship?" in Inwood, Brad, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, Vol. XXXIX, Oxford: OUP.
- Nielsen, K., and Phillips, D.Z., 2005, *Wittgensteinian Fideism?* London: SCM Press.
- Nussbaum, Martha, 2001 (1986), *The Fragility of Goodness*, Revised Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Orr, D. J., 1989, "Did Wittgenstein Have a Theory of Hinge Propositions?" in *Philosophical Investigations*, 12, pp. 134-153.
- Philipp, Peter, 1993, "Philosophical Investigations 293: Private versus Public Beetles" in *Working Papers No. 6* (eds. P. Philipp, R. Raatzsch), Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen, Norway, as found in <http://wittgensteinrepository.org/agora-wab/article/view/2924/3570> (accessed 13/08/2018).
- Pritchard, D., 2017, "Wittgenstein on Hinge Commitments and Radical Scepticism in 'On Certainty'" in H-J Glock & J Hyman (eds), *A Companion to Wittgenstein*, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, pp. 563-575.
- Pritzl, Kurt, 1983, "Aristotle and Happiness after Death: Nicomachean Ethics 1. 10-11", *Classical Philology*, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp.101-111.
- Πεντζοπούλου-Βαλαλά, Τ., 1994, "Η θεολογία του Αριστοτέλη", στο *Αριστοτέλης [Οντολογία, Γνωσιοθεωρία, Ηθική, Πολιτική Φιλοσοφία]-Αφιέρωμα στον J. P. Anton*, επιμ. Δ.Ζ. Ανδριόπουλος, Θεσ/νίκη.
- Shields, Christopher, 2007, "Unified Agency and Akrasia in Plato's Republic" in Christopher Bobonich and Pierre Destree, eds., *Akrasia in Greek Philosophy: From Socrates to Plotinus*, Brill, pp. 61-86.
- Shields, Christopher, 2010, "Plato's divided soul", in *Plato's Republic: A Critical Guide*, by Mark L. McPherran, ed., CUP, pp. 147-170.
- Syméon le Nouveau Théologien, 1967, *Traité théologiques et éthiques, tome II: Éthiques 4-15*, Sources Chrétiennes, Vol. 129.
- Σακελλάριου, Κ., 1796, *Αρχαιολογία συνοπτική των Ελλήνων: Περιέχουσα τας δογματικές, πολιτικές και πολεμικές τάξεις, άμα δε και τα ήθη αυτών, και άλλα πλείστα αξιόλογα ως εν τω πίνακι φαίνεται./Ερανισθείσα εκ διαφόρων συγγραφέων*, Βιέννη: Τυπογραφείο Γ. Βεντότη.
- Stroud, B., 2000, *Meaning, Understanding, and Practice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Todd, Robert B., 2014, *Themistius: On Aristotle on the Soul*, A&C Black.
- Tongeren, Paul J. M. van, 2014, "Salvation and creation: on the role of forgiveness in the completion of Paul Ricoeur's philosophy", *International Journal of Philosophy and Theology*, 75, 2, pp. 169-182.
- Turner, H. J. M., 1990, *Symeon the New Theologian and Spiritual*

- Fatherhood*, Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Unamuno, Miguel de, 1954, *Tragic Sense of Life*, J. E. Crawford Fitch (trans.), New York: Dover Publications.
- Vasiliou, Iakovos, 2015, "Plato, Forms, and Moral Motivation", *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. by Brad Inwood, Vol. 49, pp. 37-70.
- Vernant, Jean-Pierre, 1987, "Formes de croyance et de rationalité en Grèce ancienne/Forms of Belief and of Rationality in Ancient Greece", *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions*, Année 1987, 63-1, pp. 115-123.
- Vlastos, Gregory, 1952, "Theology and Philosophy in Early Greek Thought", *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 7, pp. 97-123.
- Ward, Keith, 2016, Book Review of *Silvia Jonas: Ineffability and its Metaphysics: The Unspeakable in Art, Religion, and Philosophy*, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, 2016.06.18 (as found here: <https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/ineffability-and-its-metaphysics-the-unspeakable-in-art-religion-and-philosophy/> access: 20-07-2020)
- Williams, B., 1973, "The Makropoulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality" in *Problems of the Self*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 82-100.
- Williams, B., 1981, *Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wittgenstein, L., 1969, *On Certainty*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, tr. D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wittgenstein, L., 2009, *Philosophical Investigations*, revised 4th edn. Edited by P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1953, *Philosophical Investigations*, G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.), Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1958.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1965, "A Lecture on Ethics", *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 74, No. 1, pp. 3-12
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1973, *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, Wiley-Blackwell.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1980, *Culture and Value*, Peter Winch (trans.), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Wright, Crispin, 1989, "Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, Privacy, and Intention", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 86, pp. 622-634.
- Χρήστου, Π., 1962, *Αγίου Γρηγορίου Παλαμά Συγγράμματα*, τ.2, Θεσσαλονίκη [St Gregory Palamas, Volume 2- Chrestou edition, "Defence of the Hesychasts", Question 1, Answer 2, Triads I, Q.1, A.2;

English text in Palmer, G. E. H., Sherrard, P., and Ware, K., eds., 1988, *The Philokalia*, Volume 4, Faber & Faber, pp. 333-8.
Zeller, E. and Nestle, W., 1988, *Ιστορία της Ελληνικής Φιλοσοφίας*, μτφ. από τα γερμανικά Χ. Θεοδωρίδης, Αθήνα, pp. 259-260, pp. 325-326.